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COMMENTS 
Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's 
1977-1978 Term 
Indian tribes occupy a unique status as governmental units 
within the federal system. Although most tribes exercise at least 
some governmental powers,' the source of these powers raises an 
interesting doctrinal question: Do Indian tribes exercise inherent 
powers of a sovereign or only congressionally delegated powers? 
Courts2 and commentators3 generally agree that tribes exercise 
powers of limited sovereignty.' Nevertheless, notions of inherent 
sovereignty have not bound the courts to decide cases in accord- 
ance with the theoretical underpinnings of this abstract doctrine. 
The judicial role in the developing doctrine of tribal sovereignty 
has been a dynamic one. And, although the concept of tribal 
sovereignty is generally recognized, certain judicial modifications 
of the doctrine arguably imply that Indian tribes do not possess 
1. This Comment will deal only with those federally recognized Indian tribes that 
possess at  least some powers of self-government. 
2. E . g ,  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Ortiz-Barraza v. United 
States, 612 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). Rut cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 
376,379 (1886): "Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil 
and the people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of 
the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exists within the broad domain of 
sovereignty but these two." 
3. E.g., F. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1971); 
Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. 
L. REV. 955, 955-56 (1972). Contra, AMERICAN I DUN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL 
REPORT 573-82 (1977) (separate dissenting views of Congressman Lloyd Meeds) 
[hereinafter cited as POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION]; Martone, American Indian Tribal Self- 
(hvernment in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 600 (1976). 
4. Probably the foremost Indian law commentator, the late Felix Cohen, gave the 
following definition of the extent of tribal governing power: 
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sover- 
eign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to  the legislative power of the 
United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty 
of the tribe, e.g., its powers to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does 
not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local 
self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and 
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full 
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly 
constituted organs of government. 
F. COHEN, supra note 3, a t  123 (footnotes omitted). 
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the inherent rights of sovereignty, but are limited to the exercise 
of delegated powers. 
A universally recognized tenet of Indian law is that the fed- 
eral government has "plenary" power over the Indian tribes? 
Thus follows a basic limitation upon inherent tribal sovereignty: 
tribal powers can be limited by congressional act.6 Because of this 
broad limitation, one might reasonably question the meaningful- 
ness of the distinction betjeen inherent tribal power and congres- 
sionally delegated power. Surely an inherent power that can be 
severely limited is no great power. 
Congress, however, apparently is not inclined to impose any 
major limiting legislation upon the Indian tribes. Indeed, the 
congressional disposition appears to be clearly to the contrary. 
Current federal policy encourages tribes to determine their own 
futures within the scope of limited federal supervision. Given this 
legislative policy, judicial delineations of tribal sovereignty play 
a major role in determining the scope of tribal governmental 
power. 
Tribal sovereignty is evidenced by any affirmative exercise 
of tribal power. In addition, tribal sovereignty has defensive char- 
acteristics that come into play when another sovereign attempts 
to encroach upon a function of the tribal government.' The major 
source of tribal sovereignty doctrine, both historical and modern, 
comes from cases involving this "defensive" aspect. Recently, 
however, cases involving affirmative exercises of power have 
gained some prominence as tribes have attempted to exercise 
governmental powers in new areas. 
Three cases from the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 Term illus- 
trate the application of the tribal sovereignty doctrine in novel 
factual settings. The first case presents the question of whether 
a tribe can exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian? The 
5. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974). "The source of federal authority 
over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally 
recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with 
Indian tribes and for treaty making." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 
U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). 
6. Governmental powers of Indian tribes are also limited by treaty provisions. How- 
ever, the United States has not entered a treaty with the Indians since 1871, when Con- 
gress passed a law prohibiting future pacts. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 
566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 5 71 (1976)). 
7. This principle is of early origin. "Jean Bodin perceived in his Six livres de  la 
rkpublique, published in 1577, that sovereignty has a double aspect: it means that the 
state, or the prince, is the supreme power over subjects in a particular territory; second, 
it also signifies that the state enjoys freedom from interference by other states." I. DELUPIS, 
INTERNATIONAL L WAND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 3 (1974). 
8. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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second case examines whether a tribe is an arm of the federal 
government for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.' The third 
case interprets the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to determine 
if it implies both a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and a 
federal cause of action against a tribal officer.1° 
This Comment will first examine the historical foundation 
and modern development of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. A 
brief analysis of current federal Indian policy will then be under- 
taken to show the legislative context in which the sovereignty 
decisions must be understood. This will be followed by a close 
examination of the tribal sovereignty aspects of the 1977-1978 
cases. Finally, conclusions will be drawn concerning the tribal 
sovereignty doctrine, its current vitality, and its applicability in 
varying factual contexts. 
A. Laying the Groundwork 
Like many federal law principles, the judicial doctrine of 
tribal sovereignty owes its birth to Chief Justice John Marshall. 
His opinions in Cherokee Nation u. Georgialt and Worcester v. 
Georgiat2 are important for more than historical perspective; 
many modern decisions continue to cite one or both of the opin- 
ions for basic Indian law  proposition^.^^ 
In 1827, the Cherokee Nation asserted its powers of sover- 
eignty through the adoption of a constitution.14 In response, the 
State of Georgia attempted to make its laws generally applicable 
to the territory occupied by the Cherokees. The tribe brought an 
original bill in the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin Georgia from 
enforcing its laws on the Cherokee-occupied land. Although ulti- 
mately finding the Court lacked original jurisdiction because the 
Cherokees did not constitute a "foreign nation," Justice Marshall 
did take advantage of the opportunity to explain some basic char- 
acteristics of the nature of tribal existence within the federal 
scheme: l5 
9. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
10. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).. 
11. 30 U S .  (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
12. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
13. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,555 (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973); Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741, 744 
(9th Cir. 1971); Yanito v. Barber, 348 F. Supp. 587, 590 (D. Utah 1972). 
14. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 500, 503 (1969). 
15. Compare Marshall's use of a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as a stage to pro- 
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Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unques- 
tionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they 
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary 
cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether 
those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries 
of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated 
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denomi- 
nated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to 
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must 
take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation 
to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.'" 
The substantive controversy between Georgia and the Chero- 
kee Nation had to wait but one more year to be heard. Samuel 
Worcester, a non-Indian missionary, was indicted for the crime 
under Georgia law of " 'residing within the limits of the Cherokee 
nation without a license.' "I7 Worcester was found guilty in the 
Georgia courts and he appealed his conviction to the United 
States Supreme Court. Justice Marshall, after a lengthy analysis 
of the applicable treaties, held that the United States through 
federal statutes and treaties had sought to exclusively regulate 
intercourse with the Indians. This, in effect, barred any state 
attempt to govern the Indian territory. "The act of the state of 
Georgia . . . [was] consequently void, and the judgment a nul- 
lity."'" 
Marshall made a number of statements in his majority opin- 
ion from which the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty would 
eventually be forged. In describing the Europeans' reaction to and 
treatment of the Indians as they came to the New World, for 
example, he said, "The Indian nations had always been consid- 
ered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining 
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the 
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that 
imposed by irresistible power . . . ."19 According to Marshall, the 
principles of international law mandated that this independent 
status should remain, at least in part: "[Tlhe settled doctrine 
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender 
its independence-its right to self-government, by associating 
pound doctrinal principles in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Supreme 
Court has the power of judicial review of congressional legislation). 
16. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537 (quoting the Georgia indictment). 
18. Id. at 561. 
19. Id. at 559. 
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with 
I 
dian 
rules 
a stronger, and taking its prote~tion."~~ 
Thus, Marshall drew conclusions regarding the status of In- 
nations from the tenets of international law. Although the 
of international law that influenced Marshall's findings are 
not deemed important in modern decisions, his conclusions are. 
Subsequent courts have struggled to apply these conclusions to 
the difficult problems involved in tribal attempts to exercise gov- 
ernmental powers and state and federal attempts to encroach 
upon those powers. 
B. The Modern Development-State Encroachment 
Modern interpretations of the scope of tribal governmental 
power have evolved in the context of state attempts to assert 
powers of government over tribes and individual Indians. The 
starting point is the case of Williams v. Lee," decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1959. The case involved an attempt by a non- 
Indian (Lee) who operated a store on the Navajo reservation in 
Arizona to bring a collection suit against a Navajo couple in the 
Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a trial court 
judgment for Lee, holding that since Congress had not expressly 
proscribed such state court jurisdiction over Indians, the exercise 
of jurisdiction was proper.22 
Upon certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Arizona judgment was reversed. Justice Black, speaking for a 
unanimous Court, relied on Worcester for the principle that state 
assertions of jurisdiction over persons on Indian reservations are 
generally invalid in the absence of congressional approval? How- 
ever, the Court recognized that some intrusiohs by states had 
been allowed.24 Reconciling this with the general rule of no state 
jurisdiction, the Court concluded: "Essentially, absent governing 
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state 
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
20. Id. a t  560-61. 
21. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The fact that more than 100 years (1832-1959) are skipped 
in this analysis should not be taken to imply that no important decisions were handed 
down during this time. However, none of the cases decided in this period possess the 
broad, fundamental significance of the Cherokee cases of the early 1830's. Decisions from 
this period that may have particular relevance in any further discussion will be noted 
therein. 
22. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241,244-46,319 P.2d 998,1001-02 (1958), reu'd, 358 US. 
217 (1959). 
23. 358 U.S. a t  218-19. 
24. State courts have been allowed to hear cases brought by an Indian against an 
outsider and to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation by one non- 
Indian against another. Id. at 219-20. 
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own laws and be ruled by them."" This conclusion has since been 
referred to as the "infringement test." Because the Court deter- 
mined the Arizona court's assertion of jurisdiction infringed upon 
the tribal right of self-government, the decision of the Arizona 
Supreme Court was reversed." 
Interestingly, the word "sovereignty" does not appear in the 
Court's opinion. Nevertheless, the concept of inherent govern- 
mental power underlies the basic rationale of the decision. It was 
the defensive aspect of sovereignty, i. e., the right to be free from 
outside intrusion, that was involved in Williams. The rights of 
sovereignty recognized by the Court were not delegated to the 
tribe by Congress. Rather, they were the inherent governmental 
powers of the Navajo Tribe which had neither been extinguished 
nor relinquished. 
The Court's reliance on tribal sovereignty is evidenced by its 
failure to rely on the treaty entered into between the Navajo 
Tribe and the United States. The Court noted that "[i]mplicit 
in [the] treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees 
involved in Worcester u. Georgia, was the understanding that the 
internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed."" In 
Worcester, the Court had relied on a treaty guarantee of tribal 
self-government to invalidate an attempted state encroach- 
ment.28 In Williams, however, the Court reasoned that the treaty 
recognized the power of tribal self-government and this preexist- 
ing power, not the treaty itself, thwarted the attempted state 
encroachment. 
Three years after Williams, the Supreme Court issued an 
opinion interpreting the infringement test laid out in Williams. 
In Organized Village of Kake u. Egan,a the power of the State of 
Alaska to impose its fishing regulations on the Kakes and the 
Angoons, two Alaskan nonreservation Indian groups organized 
under the Indian Reorganization Act, was tested. The majority 
opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, liberally interpreted 
the infringement test so as to allow more state interference with 
tribal affairs than Justice Black probably had intended in his 
Williams opinion? Given the nonreservation status of the Kakes 
and the Angoons, the Court's reliance on the infringement ratio- 
- - -- -- -- - - - - -- 
25. Id. at 220. 
26. Id. at 223. 
27. Id. at 221-22. 
28. See Martone, supra note 3, at 621. 
29. 369 US. 60 (1962). 
30. See id. at 72-76. 
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nale was probably mi~guided.~' 
Another important case of the 1960's was Warren Trading 
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission. 32 Warren Trading Post in- 
volved an attempt by Arizona to impose its income tax on a 
trading post licensed by the federal government to do business on 
the Navajo Reservation.= The Arizona state courts upheld the tax 
and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court, however, did not 
rely upon an application of the infringement test to invalidate the 
tax. Rather, it was struck down because "the assessment and 
collection of this tax would to a substantial extent frustrate the 
evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no burden shall be 
imposed upon Indian traders . . . except as authorized by Acts 
of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated under those 
Acts."34 Thus, the Court apparently relied on preemption princi- 
ples to protect the tribe from state encroachment, much as it did 
in W o r ~ e s t e r . ~ ~  
The infringement and the preemption rationales were syn- 
thesized in the 1973 decision of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commi~sion.~~ Arizona had attempted to impose its income tax 
on a Navajo woman living on the reservation and earning all of 
her income on the reservation. The Arizona courts upheld the tax. 
However, as in Williams and Warren Trading Post, the United 
States Supreme Court again reversed the Arizona courts. 
In a unanimous decision, Justice Marshall explained the 
proper test: 
[Tlhe trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian 
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on 
federal pre-emption. The modem cases thus tend to avoid reli- 
ance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look in- 
- - -- 
31. The Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U S .  164 (1973), 
distinguished Kake by limiting its application to nonreservation Indians. Id. at 176 n.15. 
McClanahan's companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 145 (1973), 
demonstrates that even reservation Indians lose a good deal of their sovereignty-based 
protections when they venture outside of their boundaries. "Absent express federal law 
to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held 
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." 
Id. at 148-49. In Mescalero, the Court upheld a New Mexico gross receipts tax on the 
Mescalero Apache Tribe's ski resort operated on nonreservation land. 
32. 380 US. 68!j (1965). 
33. The opinion does not clarify whether the trading post was operated by Indians or 
non-Indians. 
34. 380 US. at  691. 
35. The Court later asserted that the Wawen Tmding Post decision was not exclu- 
sively based on preemption principles. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 
U.S. 164, 170 n.6 (1973). 
36. 411 US. 164 (1973). 
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stead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the 
limits of state power. 
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not be- 
cause it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, 
but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes mus t  be read." 
The Court, after examining the applicable treaty and statutes, 
determined the federal position had consistently been that Ari- 
zona could not tax the Indians on the Navajo Reservation. 
Although the McClanahan decision signals a retreat from 
exclusive reliance on principles of sovereignty in decisions involv- 
ing ~tate~encroachments, it arguably strengthens the tribal posi- 
tion v i s -h i s  the states. Since the infringement test was some- 
times interpreted so as to allow significant state intrusions, the 
protection afforded the tribes by that test was tenuous, even 
though it was based on notions of inherent powers of self- 
government ?' 
Although tribal protection from state encroachment under 
the McClanahan test depends basically on the existence of an 
applicable statute or treaty, this does not necessarily mean the 
courts will require specific statutory or treaty language in order 
to insulate tribes from state action. Indeed, the McClanahan - 
Court relied heavily upon implications from the relevant statutes 
and treaty? A broad reading of the relevant law is justified in 
light of the McClanahan rule that requires statutes and treaties 
to be read against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty. Hence, as 
the pertinent law is analyzed, there exists a presumption against 
state encroachmeqt 
37. Id. at 172 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
38. A 1971 case, in addition to foreshadowing McClanahan's emphasis on the applica- 
ble treaties and legislation in state encroachment cases, highlighted the difference be- 
tween sole reliance on the infringement test and reliance instead on federal law. In Ken- 
nerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam), the Court was confronted with 
a fact situation similar to Williams. Kennerly involved a state court action against reser- 
vation Indians to collect a debt incurred on the reservation. However, the Blackfeet Tribe 
involved in Kennerly had passed a law consenting to concurrent civil jurisdiction over 
tribal members with the State of Montana. Even though tribal consent vitiated any claim 
of state infringement, the Court relied on the "governing Act of Congress" language of the 
Williams infringement test to invalidate state court jurisdiction. The governing act was 
Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at  18 U.S.C. Ej 1162 (1976), 
25 U.S.C. Sj§ 1321-1326 (1976), and 28 U.S.C. $ 1360 (1976)) (for a brief discussion of 
Public Law 280, see note 45, infra), and since Montana had not assumed civil jurisdiction 
by affirmative legislation (Montana had assumed criminal jurisdiction), the Court held 
that state court jurisdiction under the facts presented was improper. 
39. See 411 U.S. a t  173-79. 
40. The Court noted that there was little chance that a state encroachment case 
would come up where no federal treaty or legislation applied since "in almost all cases 
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Federal Indian policy has been characterized by a marked 
lack of consistency. From the late eighteenth century until only 
recently, the policy pattern can generally be described as one of 
vacillation between two extremes: (1) the policy of separa- 
tion-the tribes should be separated from the general non-Indian 
population; and (2) the policy of assimilation-the Indians 
should be acculturated into the general American society.41 The 
treatymaking and reservation days of the first half of the nine- 
teenth century,42 the assimilative General Allotment Act of 
1887,43 the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,44 and the termina- 
tion legislation of the 1 9 5 0 ' ~ ~ ~  all represent divergent attempts by 
the federal government to finally solve the "Indian problem." 
federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction." Id. 
at 172 n.8. 
41. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 139, 139-40 (19'77). 
42. For a general discussion of early federal Indian pol'icy, see S. TYLER, A HISTORY 
OF INDIAN POLJCY 32-94 (1973). For a good discussion of judicial review of treaties, see 
Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water 
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth9'-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 
601 (1975). 
43. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The 
major facet of the General Allotment Act was a provision for land allotments to be given 
to individual Indians. Ch. 119, § 1,24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. 5 331 (1976)). 
Congress hoped that this would encourage the Indians to imitate the white man and to 
follow his ways. See S. TYLER, supra note 42, at 95-124; Washburn, The Historical Context 
of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 12, 18-19 (1976). 
44. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version a t  25 U.S.C. 55 461-479 (1976)). The Reor- 
ganization Act played a major role in the revitalization of the t~ibes. For one thing, it 
ended the practice of individual allotments which had seriously eroded the reservation 
land bases. Additionally, the Act acknowledged the tribes' right to organize governments 
and authorized the adoption of tribal constitutions and bylaws. Ch. 576, 5 16, 48 Stat. 
984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976)). For a general discussion of the Indian Reorganiza- 
tion Act, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972). 
45. The policy of termination was generally spelled out in a House Concurrent Reso- 
lution: 
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians 
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and 
entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other 
citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, 
and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American 
citizenship . . . . 
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). Termination legislation 
took both particular and general forms. Some tribes were expressly terminated. E.g., Act 
of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 5 4  903-903f (1976))). The foregoing 
legislation dealt with the termination and later restoration of the Menominee Tribe. 
Restoration is an atypical result for a terminated tribe. For a chronicle of the Menominee 
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Current federal policy recognizes the failure of the termina- 
tion legislation and does not purport to constitute a quick and 
final disposition of the "Indian problem." It is succinctly de- 
scribed by the appellation, "Indian self-determinati~n."~~ The 
Supreme Court has declared that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968" was passed partially in furtherance of the goals of self- 
determination? Likewise, two years after the passage of the In- 
dian Civil Rights Act, the policy of self-determination was clearly 
articulated in a speech to Congress by then-President Nixon." 
President Nixon recognized that federal policy had varied 
between two extremes: (1) excessive federal paternalism, and (2) 
termination of the federal-tribal relati~nship.~~ In order to combat 
this discordant pattern, President Nixon made the following rec- 
ommendation: 
This, then, must be the goal of any new national policy 
toward the Indian people: to strengthen the Indian's sense of 
autonomy without threatening his sense of community. We 
must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own 
life without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group. 
And we must make it clear that Indians can become indepen- 
experience, see Preloznik & Felsenthal, The Menominee Struggle to Maintain Their 
Tribal Assets and Protect Their Treaty Rights Following Termination, 51 N.D.L. REV. 53 
(1974). 
Another major piece of termination legislation, general in its application, is com- 
monly referred to as Public Law 280. It granted certain states jurisdiction over all civil 
and criminal matters occurring on Indian reservations. It  also allowed any other of the 
unnamed states to assert similar jurisdiction by affirmative legislative act. Public Law 
280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 5 1162 (1976), 25 U.S.C. $5  
1321-1326 (1976), and 28 U.S.C. 5 1360 (1976)). For a background discussion of the termi- 
nation policy, see Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 41. 
46. See, e.g., Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 41, a t  162-65; Comment, The Indian 
Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 463 (1970). It  is still too early to tell 
whether this policy will endure or whether it is simply another in a long procession of 
short-lived federal formulas. 
47. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tits. II-VII, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 55  1301-1341 
(1976)). The ICRA made most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights proscriptions applicable 
to Indian tribes (the ICRA contains no establishment clause, for example). The Bill of 
Rights was previously considered inapplicable to the tribes because the Supreme Court 
had held in 1896 that the fifth amendment grand jury clause was unenforceable against 
the Cherokee Tribe. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The Talton Court adopted the 
following rationale: "It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the 
Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth 
Amendment, which . . . had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the 
Constitution on the National Government." Id. a t  384. Talton was generally interpreted 
as making the Bill of Rights as a whole inoperable against Indian tribes. See, e.g., Native 
Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). 
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-66 (1978). 
49. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564. 
50. Id. a t  566-69. 
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dent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal con- 
cern and Federal support.51 
The President's primary intent was to allow the Indians to control 
appropriate federal programs, especially local e d u c a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Congress' response is exemplified by the Indian Self- 
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975." A portion 
of the declaration of the Act's policy reads: 
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance 
of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship 
with and responsibility to the Indian people through the estab- 
lishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy 
which will permit an orderly transition from Federal domination 
of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaning- 
ful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, 
and administration of those programs and services.54 
The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to contract out various 
programs to the tribes upon request.55 Furthermore, it directs the 
Department of the Interior to grant funds upon tribal request for 
the improvement of tribal governments, and HEW to do the same 
for the development or improvement of health facilities." Like- 
wise, it contains broad provisions for Indian involvement in the 
education of Indian children? 
A few days prior to the passage of the Indian Self- 
Determination and Education Assistance Act, Congress, in a 
joint resolution, created the American Indian Policy Review 
Commission to make a "comprehensive review of Indian af- 
f a i r ~ . " ~ ~  The Commission submitted its final report to Congress 
on May 17, 1977. The Commission endorsed the policy of self- 
determination and identified two basic principles of Indian law 
to guide future policy determinations: (1) tribal sovereignty, and 
(2) a federal-tribal trust relationship? 
51. Id. at $566-67. 
52. Id. at 567-71. 
53. Pub, L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42, 50 
U.S.C.). 
54. 25 U.S.C. (j 450a(b) (1976). 
55. Id. $ 4  450f-450g. 
56. Id. (j 450h. 
57. Id. (j$ 455-458e. 
58. Id. (r 174 note. 
59. Specifically, the Commission stated: 
The fundamental concepts which must guide future policy determinations 
are: 
1. That Indian tribes are sovereign political bodies, having the power to 
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True to the legislative mandate, the Commission's report is 
indeed comprehensive," and no attempt is made here to summa- 
rize it. Concerning legislation affecting tribal sovereignty, the 
report states: "This Commission has not proposed any legislative 
action with regard to the jurisdiction or authority of tribal govern- 
ments. We have rejected any such effort as being premature and 
not warranted by any factual evidence."" So long as Congress 
endorses this view and refrains from passing legislation affecting 
inherent tribal authority, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty as 
interpreted by the judiciary will play a major role in the tribes' 
pursuit of self-determination. With this in mind, the Supreme 
Court's sovereignty analysis in three recent decisions will now be 
studied. 
IV. THE CASES OF THE 1977-1978 TERM 
None of the 1977-1978 Supreme Court sovereignty decisions 
involved attempted state encroachments upon tribal sovereignty. 
Since modern development of the sovereignty doctrine primarily 
concerned such state encroachments, the 1977-1978 decisions 
offer profitable comparisons of the application of the doctrine in 
different factual contexts. 
A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
I .  Facts and posture before the Court 
Mark David Oliphant was arrested by authorities of the Su- 
quamish Indian Tribe during the annual Chief Seattle Days cele- 
determine their own membership and power to enact laws and enforce them 
within the boundaries of their reservations, and 
2. That the relationship which exists between the tribes and the United 
States is premised on a special trust that must govern the conduct of the 
stronger toward the weaker. 
POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, a t  3-5. 
The Policy Review Commission was not without its dissenters. Vice Chairman Lloyd 
Meeds vigorously disagreed with the majority report. He claimed that the report was "the 
product of one-sided advocacy in favor of American Indian tribes." Id. a t  571 (separate 
dissenting views of Congressman Lloyd Meeds). His main point of contention was the 
majority report's view of tribal sovereignty: 
Id. 
The fundamental error of this report is that it  perceives the American 
Indian tribe as a body politic in the nature of a sovereign as that word is used 
to describe the United States and the States, rather than as a body politic which 
the United States, through its sovereign power, permits to govern itself and 
order its internal affairs, but not the affairs of others. The report seeks to convert 
a political notion into a legal doctrine. 
it 573 (emphasis in original). 
60. The Commission made 206 specific recommendations. 
61. POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, a t  5. 
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bration sponsored by the tribe. He was charged with assaulting a 
tribal officer and resisting arrest. Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested 
by authorities of the same tribe after a high-speed chase ending 
in a collision between Belgarde's car and a tribal police car. He 
was charged with "recklessly endangering another person" and 
with injuring tribal property. Both Oliphant and Belgarde were 
non-Indians who resided on the Suquamish Reservation. 
Both men petitioned the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington for writs of habeas corpus. Tribal 
proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of the habeas peti- 
tions. Both petitioners argued the Suquamish Indian Provisional 
Court lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The district 
court denied the habeas petitions. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the denial of Oliphant's petition, reasoning that 
"the power to preserve order on the reservation, when necessary 
by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua non of the 
sovereignty that the' Suquamish originally pos~essed."~~ Judge 
Kennedy dissented, explaining that "[plrinciples of 'tribal sov- 
ereignty' developed in the preemption context simply have no 
application [to the problem presented] here? Focusing on rele- 
vant legislation rather than the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 
Judge Kennedy concluded, "Unlike the majority, I would not 
require an express congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction" to 
divest the tribe of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian~.~' While 
Belgarde's appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, the Su- 
preme Court granted both Oliphant's and Belgarde's certiorari 
petitions to "decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. "65 
2. Sovereignty analysis 
Oliphant u. Suquamish Indian TribeM presented the Court 
with a problem never before presented: the propriety of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the absence of congres- 
sional authorization. The Suquamish Tribe based its claim of 
62. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The circuit court stated the issue as 
follows: "The question is not whether Congress has conferred jurisdiction upon the tribe. 
The tribe, before it was conquered, had jurisdiction, as any independent nation does. The 
question therefore is, did Congress (or a treaty) take that jurisdiction away?" Id. at 1009 
n.1. 
63. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
64. Id. at 1019. 
65. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
66. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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right to prosecute non-Indians on its powers of inherent sover- 
eignty. Because Congress had not expressly taken away its power 
to prosecute non-Indians, the tribe argued it retained such power 
as part of its inherent sovereignty. Oliphant and Belgarde argued 
that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is a t  odds with principles 
of international law, decisions of the Supreme Court, and federal 
law." Thus, the issue was framed so as to turn on the basic dis- 
tinction of whether, in the absence of a governing treaty or con- 
gressional act, Indian tribes exercise inherent or delegated power. 
Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, went great 
lengths to demonstrate that at one time all three branches of the 
federal government shared the view that Indian tribes lack crimi- 
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians." With regard to this 
"commonly shared presumption," Justice Rehnquist stated: 
"[Wlhile not conclusive on the issue before us, [the presump- 
tion] carries considerable weight. "" 
The opinion then examined the applicable treaty, the Treaty 
of Point Elliott. Relying upon language of the treaty wherein the 
Suquamish Tribe acknowledged its dependence on the United 
States and promised to deliver up federal offenders to the United 
States, Rehnquist concluded that, when viewed in historical con- 
text, these passages cast "substantial doubt" on the right of the 
tribe to prosecute n~n-Indians.~O The. Court admitted, however, 
that the treaty provisions alone would be insufficient to deprive 
the Suquamish Tribe of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." 
Without treaty or statutory provisions upon which to base a 
decision, the Court was faced squarely with the task of defining 
the general governing powers of an American Indian tribe. The 
Court responded by fashioning the following characterization of 
Indian tribal powers: 
[T]he tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited 
only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enact- 
67. Brief for Petitioners a t  19-20, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 
( 1978). 
68. 435 U.S. a t  196-206. Justice Rehnquist considered this view to be "shared" by the 
"lower federal courts" on the basis of one federal district court case decided in 1878, Ex 
parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720). 435 U.S. a t  199-201, 206. 
69. 435 U.S. a t  206. 
70. Id. at 206-08. The Court attempted to reconcile this conclusion with a general rule 
of Indian treaty construction that "ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of 
the Indian parties concerned," Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 42, a t  617, by implying 
that the meaning of the treaty provisions is " 'clear from the surrounding circumstances.' " 
435 U.S. a t  208 n.17 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 
( 19%) ). 
71. 435 U.S. a t  208. 
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ments. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are 
prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous 
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those pow- 
ers "inconsistent with their status."72 
Oliphant's "inconsistent with their status" exception, later 
referred to by the Court as the "implicit divestiture" e~ception,?~ 
deserves close attenti~n. '~ The Court noted that two other powers 
had previously been found to be inconsistent with the Indians' 
status: the power to convey reservation land75 and the power to 
form political alliances with foreign nations.'Vhe Court, how- 
ever, emphasized that the implicit divestiture exception is not 
"restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands or 
exercise external political ~overeignty."~~ 
The Court also quoted a passage from a separate opinion of 
Justice Johnson in the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck for the propo- 
sition that Indian tribes lack power over anyone but themselves. 
"[TJhe restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount 
. . . to an exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] 
from their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty 
amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits 
except themselves. "7R At best this sentence is misleading; at worst 
it is wrong. In the context of Johnson's opinion, it came as an 
answer to his own question: "What, then, practically, is the inter- 
est of the states in the soil of the Indians within their 
b~undaries?"~~ At first glance, the portion of the answer following 
the semicolon seems to suggest that the Indians have the right to 
govern everyone within their borders "except themselves," a pat- 
ently absurd conclusion. One reasonable interpretation of this 
72. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 544 F.2d a t  1009). 
73. The Court used "implicit divestiture" in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
326 (1978), to refer to the exception to tribal sovereignty promulgated in Oliphant. 
"Implicit divestiture" will be used instead of "inconsistent with their status" to refer to 
the exception both because of its preferred length and its preferred descriptiveness. 
74. This formulation is similar to the second prong of Cohen's definition of tribal 
governing powers, set out in full a t  note 4 supra. Cohen distinguishes between internal 
powers, like local self-government, and external powers, such as forming treaties with 
foreign nations. Cohen states the external powers are terminated upon conquest, appar- 
ently because such powers are inconsistent with the tribes' status relative to the United 
States, 
75. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
76. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831). 
77. 435 US.  a t  209. 
78. Id. (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (separate opinion of Johnson, J.)). 
79. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (separate opinion of Johnson, 
.J.). Since the question inquires into the interests of the states, Rehnquist's bracketed 
insertion of "to the United States" results in a misquotation. 
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confusing sentence is that the limitations on Indian sovereignty 
allow the states the right of governing every person within tribal 
limits except the Indians. This would at least be a logical, if not 
accurate, answer to the question posed.80 The statement, if inter- 
preted in this manner, says nothing directly about the Indians' 
power to govern non-Indians. 
The Court in Oliphant ultimately concluded that the exer- 
cise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with 
the status of Indian tribes?' The rationale employed in arriving 
at this result deserves full illumination: 
Protection of territory within its external political boundaries is, 
of course, as central to the sovereign interests of the United 
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But from the forma- 
tion of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
United States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its 
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted 
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United 
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifesta- 
tion of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to 
the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes 
therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citi- 
zens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to 
Congress. This principle would have been obvious a century ago 
when most Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed 
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice." . . . It should be 
no less obvious today, even though present-day Indian tribal 
courts embody dramatic advances over their historical antece- 
dentsex2 
It is difficult to extract a workable rule from this case for use 
in future cases involving the assertion of tribal power over non- 
Indians. The Court apparently concluded that any exercise of 
tribal government that intrudes without warrant on the personal 
liberty of non-Indians is inconsistent with tribal status. Beyond 
this, the Court offers no guidance in future applications of the 
implicit divestiture exception to tribal sovereignty. 
80. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Fletcher allowed the states to hold title 
to lands reserved to Indian tribes. This position was later rejected by the Marshall Court. 
Martone, supra note 3, at 619. Perhaps this explains the confusion surrounding the use 
by the Oliphant Court of the material quoted from Johnson's opinion. 
81. In a surprisingly short dissent, given the case's importance, Justice Marshall, 
joined by Chief Justice Burger, "agreerd] with the court below that the 'power to preserve 
order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish 
originally possessed.' " 435 U.S. a t  212 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 544 F.2d a t  
1009). Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. 
82. 435 U.S. at 209-10 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1834)). 
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Arguably, any exercise of governmental power by an Indian 
tribe over a non-Indian intrudes upon his personal liberty. Hence, 
the implicit divestiture exception promulgated in Oliphant could 
be used to strike down every tribal attempt to exercise jurisdic- 
tion over non-Indians." This would result in restricting the Indian 
tribes to the exclusive exercise of delegated powers in governing 
non-Indians since a power inconsistent with tribal status can only 
be exercised "in a manner acceptable to Congres~."~~ 
B. United States v. Wheeler 
1. Facts and posture before the Court 
Anthony Robert Wheeler, a Navajo, pleaded guilty to 
charges brought against him by the Navajo Tribe of disorderly 
conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Over a 
year later, Wheeler was indicted by a federal grand jury in the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona on a 
charge of statutory rape arising out of the same incident that led 
to the tribal charges. Wheeler moved to dismiss the federal charge 
on the basis of double jeopardy, since contributing to the delin- 
quency of a minor is a lesser included offense of statutory rape. 
The district court dismissed the indictment and, upon appeal, 
83. At least one lower court has interpreted Oliphunt in this manner. See Trans- 
Canada Enterprises v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribes, [I9781 5  DIM L. REP. (AILTP) # 
F-153 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1978) (relying on Oliphant, district court set aside its original 
order allowing tribe to regulate land use on non-Indian owned land and to impose business 
fees on nowIndians within the reservation). Rut see Salt River Project Agricultural Im- 
provement & Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1978) 
(memorandum and order) (Indian tribe found to possess inherent power to tax non-Indian 
interest in leased land on the reservation, Oliphant notwithstanding). 
Three years before Oliphant, the Court announced that Congress had the authority 
to delegate to a tribe the power to regulate liquor on a reservatibn. United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). The case involved a federal prosecution of a non-Indian who 
operated a tavern on privately owned land within the Wind River Reservation for doing 
business without a tribal liquor license. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, reasoned that the propriety of the delegation was enhanced by the tribe's 
"independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal 
life." Id. a t  557. One wonders whether the Court, and especially Justice Rehnquist, has 
retreated from this position since Mazurie, or whether Oliphant will be limited to its 
specific holding of divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, thus leaving 
the question of other types of jurisdiction over non-Indians, such as business regulation 
and taxation, subject to further analysis. 
The Indian Policy Review Commission stated the following with regard to tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians: "We . . . reject the notion that the jurisdictional reach of 
Indian tribes within Indian country should be limited to their own membership alone." 
POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at  5. 
84. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at  210. 
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the Ninth Circuit upheld the d i smis~a l .~~  The Ninth Circuit felt 
the case presented the question of "whether Indian tribal courts 
and federal district courts are 'arms of different sovereigns.' "M 
This was the crucial determination since, under the "dual sover- 
eignty" principle, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns 
do not amount to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts over 
whether successive prosecutions by federal and tribal authorities 
constitute double jeopardy." 
2. Sovereignty analysis 
The sovereignty issue in United States v. WheeleP arises in 
a unique factual situation. No Indian tribe's affirmative exercise 
of governmental power was being questioned, nor was a tribe 
claiming interference from another government. Rather, the deci- 
sion revolved solely around the vitality of the basic theory of 
tribal sovereignty. Indeed, the Wheeler decision turned on the 
distinction between delegated and inherent powers. 
The Court had previously held that successive prosecutions 
by state and federal governments were valid,R9 but that prosecu- 
tion by a territorial court could not be followed by federal prose- 
cution.'O The distinction lies in the concept of dual sovereignty. 
While prosecution by two different arms of the same sovereign is 
prohibited, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns do not 
constitute double je~pardy.~' Hence, the Court was faced with the 
question of whether Indian tribes are more like states or federal 
territories. 
According to Justice Stewart, "the controlling question in 
this case is the source of this power to punish tribal offenders: Is 
it a part of inherent tribal sovereignty, or an aspect of the sover- 
eignty of the Federal Government which has been delegated to 
the tribes by Congres~?"~~ A unanimous Courtg3 rejected the argu- 
85. United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 313 
( 1978). 
86. 545 F.2d a t  1256. 
87. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316 (1978). 
88. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
89. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959). 
90. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937); see Grafton v. United States, 206 
U.S. 333 (1907). 
91. For a recent discussion of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see State v. Rogers, 90 
N.M. 604, 566 P.2d 1142 (1977). 
92. 435 U.S. a t  322. 
93. .Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. 
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ment that Congress' plenary authority over the tribes necessarily 
implies that a tribe is dependent upon Congress for its source of 
power.'l Instead, "[tlhe powers of Indian tribes are, in general, 
'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been 
extinguished.' "" Summing up these powers and limitations, the 
Court attempted to delineate the scope of tribal governmental 
powers: 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and 
limited character. It  exists only a t  the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, 
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian 
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their 
dependent status.Y6 
After examining the relevant treaties and statutes, the Court 
found that the Navajo Tribe did indeed possess criminal jurisdic- 
tion over its members as a result of the tribe's retained, inherent 
sovereignty. Consequently, the federal and tribal prosecutions 
were not conducted by the same sovereign. Under the dual sover- 
eignty principle, therefore, the successive prosecutions did not 
violate the double jeopardy clause.97 
The result in Wheeler is not nearly as important as the ra- 
tionale employed in arriving a t  that result. The Court unmistaka- 
bly and explicitly concluded that the general governmental pow- 
ers exercised by an Indian tribe are inherent, not delegated. The 
Court also expanded the Oliphant implicit divestiture exception. 
The Court explained that the Indian tribes' criminal jurisdic- 
tion over their own members was not lost as a necessary result of 
their dependent status. Instead, "[tlhe areas in which such im- 
plicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred 
are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe."WI'he Court listed three areas of im- 
94. 435 US. at  319-20. 
95. Id. at  322 (emphasis in original) (quoting F. COHEN, supra note 3, at  122). 
96. Id. at  323. 
97. Id. a t  326-32. The Court also expressed concern that since tribal punishment is 
limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act to a maximum sentence of six months in jail and a 
$500 fine, an earlier tribal prosecution for a serious offense could preclude a federal prose- 
cution where a much more serious punishment could result, thereby frustrating important 
federal interests in the prosecution of major offenses. Id. at  330-31. 
The Wheeler decision demonstrates the sometimes conflicting positions of Indian 
tribes and individual Indians. Although Wheeler constitutes a victory for the tribes, it 
cannot be so described for the individual Indian. 
98. Id. a t  326. The Court's use of "nonmembers" instead of %on-Indians" is most 
likely inadvertent. I t  is not clear, for instance, whether the nonmember daughter (who, 
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plicit divestiture: (1) power to freely alienate land to non-Indians, 
(2) power to "enter into direct commercial or governmental rela- 
tions" with foreign nations, and (3) power to prosecute nonmem- 
bers? The Court explained that these are areas of implicit dives- 
titure because the tribes' dependent status is inconsistent with 
the "freedom independently to determine their external rela- 
t ion~."~ '~ '  
The Court's explanation that implicit divestiture of sover- 
eignty has occurred in areas involving relations between tribes 
and nonmembers can mean one of two things. It could mean that 
any attempt by an Indian tribe to exercise governmental power 
over nonmembers will be struck down under the implicit divesti- 
ture exception, or it could simply mean that application of the 
exception is limited to relations between tribes and non-Indians. 
In the context of the decision, the language was probably used to 
show that the implicit divestiture exception did not apply in the 
Wheeler case because it involved a tribal exercise of power over 
a tribal member. Since the exception is limited to tribal- 
nonmember relations, it could not apply to the Wheeler facts. 
The Wheeler case, then, should not be read as invalidating every 
tribal exercise of governmental power over nonmembers. Rather, 
it merely explained that when the "implicit divestiture" excep- 
tion is invoked, it will be in a tribal-nonmember context. 
C .  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
I .  Facts and posture before the Court 
Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and her 
daughter, Audrey Martinez, brought a class action suit against 
the pueblo in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Mexico. Io1 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the pueblo and its governor, in an attempt to enjoin the 
enforcement of a membership ordinance. The pueblo had passed 
an ordinance declaring that a child born of a Santa Claran father 
and a non-Santa Claran mother was a member of the pueblo, but 
although the child of a Santa Claran mother and a Navajo father and raised on the 
reservation, was refused Santa Claran membership) in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 
436 US. 49 (1978), discussed in notes 101-22 and accompanying text infra, would be in 
the same position vis-a-vis the Santa Claran Tribe as would a non-Indian residing on the 
reservation. 
99. 435 U.S. at 326. 
100. Id. 
101. Julia Martinez represented the class of Santa Claran women married to non- 
members. Audrey Martinez represented the class of children of a Santa Claran mother 
and a non-Santa Claran father. 
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a child whose father was a non-Santa Claran and whose mother 
was a Santa Claran could not be a member of the pueblo. Audrey 
Martinez had lived on the Santa Clara Reservation her entire life, 
but because her father was a Navajo she was ineligible for Santa 
Claran membership. The Martinezes alleged a denial of equal 
protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The pueblo and its 
governor moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the dis- 
trict court lacked jurisdiction to decide intratribal matters in- 
volving tribal self-government. The district court denied this 
motion, relying heavily on the great preponderance of case law 
supporting federal court jurisdiction in such a 
Following a full trial on the merits, the district court issued 
a judgment in favor of the tribe. The opinion discussed the devel- 
opment of the Santa Clara Pueblo and the historical background 
of its membership policies. The court felt that the "equal protec- 
tion" clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act should be construed 
differently from the similar federal constitutional guarantee,"13 
and concluded that the clause should not be interpreted "in a 
manner that  would invalidate a tribal membership ordinance 
when the classification attacked is one based on criteria that have 
been traditionally employed by the tribe in considering member- 
ship questions. "In4 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's holding as to jurisdiction, but reversed its decision 
on the merits.Io5 The circuit court reasoned that "to the extent 
tha t  the Indian Civil Rights Act applies, tribal immunity is 
thereby limited."'" With the immunity barrier passed, the court 
determined that 28 U.S .C. $ l343(4), which establishes federal 
jurisdiction for actions seeking to protect civil rights under an act 
of Congress,1n7 was properly a basis for jurisdiction. The circuit 
court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the equal 
protection clause of the ICRA should not be interpreted on the 
basis of fourteenth amendment precedent alone. Nevertheless, 
using fourteenth amendment standards as a "persuasive guide," 
102. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 7-8 (D.N.M. 1975), reu'd, 540 
F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
103. Id. at 17. 
104. Id. at 18. 
105. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 
49 (1978). 
106. Id. at 1042. 
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) states in part: "The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . 
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress 
providing for the protection of civil rights . . . ." 
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the court determined that the ICRA provision had been vio- 
lated.Iow The Supreme Court granted certiorari.luY 
2. Sovereignty analysis 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez1"' presented the Court with 
a task of statutory interpretation. The lower courts, in upholding 
jurisdiction, had relied on an implied congressional waiver of 
tribal sovereign immunity extracted from the terms of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act. Lending support to the lower courts' decisions 
were Justice Blackmun's recently voiced doubts "about the con- 
tinuing vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal immunity."I1' 
In spite of these arguments, the Supreme Court dealt with the 
immunity issue almost summarily in an opinion by Justice Mar- 
shall. 
The Court stated that the Indian tribes enjoy the common 
law immunity from suit enjoyed by sovereigns. Although the 
Court recognized that this aspect of tribal sovereignty could be 
limited by Congress,Il2 the Court held "that a waiver of sovereign 
immunity ' "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex- 
pressed." ' "Il3 Since the ICRA contained no express waiver of 
sovereign immunity, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity barred suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo.Il4 
The Court was still confronted, however, with the issue of 
whether the ICRA implied a cause of action against the governor 
of the pueblo since, as an officer of the pueblo, he was not pro- 
tected by sovereign immunity. Resolution of this issue involved 
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty since "providing a federal forum 
for issues arising under § 1302 [ICRA's "bill of rights"] consti- 
tutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government 
beyond that created by the change in substantive law itself."IiJ 
The Court reviewed the factors relevant "in determining whether 
a cause of action is implicit in a statute not expressly providing 
one,"%md decided that not all of the requirements were met. 
108. 540 F.2d at 1046-48. 
109. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). 
110. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
111. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 178 (1977) (Black- 
mun, J., concurring). 
112. "This aspect of tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and 
plenary control of Congress." 436 U.S. at 58. 
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United 
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))). 
114. Id. at 59. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 60. The relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a statute 
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The Court felt that  i t  was unnecessary to provide a 
"judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty" in order 
to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA.l17 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court relied on the directive of McClanahan: the ICRA must 
be read against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty."The Court 
identified two competing congressional purposes behind the 
ICRA: (1) to strengthen the "position of individual tribal mem- 
bers vis-A-vis the tribe," and (2) "to promote the well-established 
federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.' " l t Y  Analyz- 
ing these purposes against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty, the 
Court concluded that in this case, the scales tipped in favor of the 
latter purpose. Therefore, no cause of action was implied under 
the ICRA against the governor. 
Justice White dissented, arguing that the ICRA did imply a 
cause of action against the governor. Justice White agreed with 
the majority that the suit against the pueblo was barred by tribal 
immunity. He felt, however, that the underlying purposes of the 
ICRA could be furthered only by permitting the additional intru- 
sion into tribal self-government that would result from recogniz- 
ing a federal cause of action against the governor.lM 
Martinez demonstrates the reluctance of the Supreme Court 
to permit interference with the sovereignty of the Indian tribes. 
Equally significant, however, are its practical implications. The 
ICRA had provided a fruitful source of federal jurisdiction over 
cases alleging tribal abuses, but Martinez indicates that similar 
actions will now be limited to tribal courts. Moreover, since the 
Court found no congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, that 
defense will be available to a tribe in its own courts unless the 
tribe itself has expressly waived it. 
The Martinez opinion contains dictum that is curious in light 
of the recent decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler. Responding to 
a contention of the court of appeals that the constitutional norms 
of the ICRA could not be realized without federal jurisdiction, the 
implies a cause of action are: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit 
the statute was passed? (2) Is there any implicit or express legislative intent to create or 
deny such a cause of action? (3) Is the remedy sought consistent with the general policy 
of the legislative scheme? And (4) is the cause of action one normally left to the tribal 
law? Id. at  60 n.lO. 
117. Id. a t  61. 
118. Id. a t  60. 
119. Id. a t  62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
120. Id. a t  79-83 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in all parts of the 
majority opinion except the section wherein the tribe was "recognized as possessing the 
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Id. at 58. 
Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. 
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Court emphasized that tribal forums would still be available. 
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate 
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting impor- 
tant personal and property interests of both Indians and non- 
Indians. "I2' The Court cited for this proposition, a 
case in which the non-Indian party was the plaintiff. Therefore, 
perhaps the dictum was intended only to mean that non-Indians 
may bring suit in tribal courts. Surely, when a non-Indian is 
involved in an ICRA suit he will usually be the moving party since 
the ICRA prohibits abuses of civil rights by tribal governments. 
The tribe or a tribal official will normally be the defendant in 
such cases. Nevertheless, the dictum does lend credence to the 
argument that Oliphant is not the final word on the issue of 
whether tribal attempts to assert noncriminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians are valid. 
A cursory review of recent Indian law decisions could lead to 
the following conclusions concerning the Supreme Court's view of 
tribal governing powers: (1) Indian tribes have broad governmen- 
tal control over their own members, (2) encroachments upon In- 
dian tribes by other governments will generally be disallowed, 
and (3) Indian tribes lack governmental power over non-Indians. 
Unfortunately, the Court decisions used as support for these con- 
clusions have not always been based on consistent reasoning. Be- 
cause the area of Indian affairs involves major matters of policy 
(like similarly political fields), doctrinal purity in judicial deci- 
sions has sometimes been sacrificed to the pressures of public 
opinion. However, there are dangers in such a judicial course. 
Absent judicial consistency, decisional capriciousness may pre- 
vail, leaving those who might be affected by court decisions con- 
fused and uncertain, unable to reasonably predict the direction 
of the wandering judicial travail. 
Regardless of the theoretical inconsistencies inherent in rec- 
ognizing Indian tribes as sovereigns in the American system of 
federalism, the Court consistently adheres to the general position 
that tribes possess the powers of limited sovereignty. Necessarily, 
then, the actual limits imposed upon tribal sovereignty are of 
primary importance in determining the scope of tribal governing 
powers. Since treaties are no longer entered into between the 
121. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
122. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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Indians and the United States, Congress' plenary authority over 
the tribes defines the modern limits upon tribal sovereignty. 
In Oliphant, however, the Supreme Court chose to impose a 
substantial judicial limit upon tribal governing power. The Court 
announced the implicit divestiture exception to tribal sover- 
eignty, which takes away from the tribes powers that are 
"inconsistent" with tribal status. Specifically, the Court held 
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been implicitly 
divested. The Court failed, however, to describe the parameters 
of the exception, allowing uncertainty to attend the exception 
and its proper application. As a result, broad judicial limits could 
be imposed upon tribal governing powers (especially powers over 
non-Indians) without sufficient reasoning or justification. 
The Wheeler and Martinez cases demonstrate the current 
application of the predominant tribal sovereignty analy- 
sis-examining applicable statutes and treaties against the back- 
drop of tribal sovereignty. They also indicate the Court's willing- 
ness to adapt the approach developed in state encroachment 
cases to different factual contexts. In Wheeler, since no treaty or 
statute controlled the outcome, tribal sovereignty was converted 
from a backdrop to an actor a t  center stage. Recognizing the 
inherent nature of tribal sovereignty, the Court held that Wheeler 
had not been subjected to double jeopardy by successive tribal 
and federal prosecutions. In Martinez, the tribal sovereignty 
backdrop was held to immunize the Santa Clara Pueblo from suit 
absent an express congressional waiver. Additionally, the sover- 
eignty backdrop affected the Court's analysis of the ICRA to de- 
termine if the Act implied a cause of action against a tribal offi- 
cer. Because one of two competing legislative purposes of the 
ICRA was consistent with the concept of tribal sovereignty, that 
purpose prevailed. Accordingly, no cause of action was implied. 
By examining applicable treaties and statutes against the 
backdrop of tribal sovereignty, a court can fairly reconcile the 
somewhat conflicting legal principles of tribal sovereignty and 
tribal subjection to congressional authority. Such an approach 
realistically acknowledges the fundamental limiting power of 
Congress, yet it also pays proper respect to the principle of tribal 
sovereignty. However, a broad application of the implicit divesti- 
ture exception to tribal sovereignty, made possible by the failure 
of the Court to supply adequate standards, would defeat this 
approach and place the locus of limiting power in the courts. 
Therefore, the Court should announce rules to govern application 
of the implicit divestiture exception. Due deference for Congress' 
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plenary authority suggests that narrow rules should govern such 
application. 
William D. Holyoak 
